vapa-proposal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from the repository environment.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
VISION.md,README.md, and the output ofgh issue list(which contains existing issue titles and bodies from the target repository). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or clear directives to the AI to ignore instructions potentially embedded within these external project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write temporary files and execute shell commands, including creating GitHub issues via the
ghCLI. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the content fetched from the repository before it is used to draft the proposal.
- Mitigation: The risk is significantly reduced by a mandatory preview and manual confirmation step (
Step 6: Preview) where the user must explicitly approve the generated proposal before submission. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local shell script (
scripts/vapa-proposal.sh) to interface with the GitHub CLI. - The script uses variables like
$repoand$subjectderived from user input or AI inference directly in shell commands. Although variables are double-quoted (e.g.,gh api "repos/$repo/issues"), there remains a minor risk of argument injection to theghtool if the AI is manipulated into passing crafted strings containing CLI flags.
Audit Metadata