skills/insentek/vapa/vapa-proposal/Gen Agent Trust Hub

vapa-proposal

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from the repository environment.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads VISION.md, README.md, and the output of gh issue list (which contains existing issue titles and bodies from the target repository).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or clear directives to the AI to ignore instructions potentially embedded within these external project files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write temporary files and execute shell commands, including creating GitHub issues via the gh CLI.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the content fetched from the repository before it is used to draft the proposal.
  • Mitigation: The risk is significantly reduced by a mandatory preview and manual confirmation step (Step 6: Preview) where the user must explicitly approve the generated proposal before submission.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a local shell script (scripts/vapa-proposal.sh) to interface with the GitHub CLI.
  • The script uses variables like $repo and $subject derived from user input or AI inference directly in shell commands. Although variables are double-quoted (e.g., gh api "repos/$repo/issues"), there remains a minor risk of argument injection to the gh tool if the AI is manipulated into passing crafted strings containing CLI flags.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 24, 2026, 02:24 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — vapa-proposal