insta
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the official CLI installation script from the vendor's GitHub repository.
- Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/InsForge/insta-cli/main/install.sh | shinSKILL.md. This is documented as the standard installation method for the InsForge toolset. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves executing a remote script via shell.
- Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to install the CLI tool using a piped shell command when it is not present in the environment. This execution is limited to official vendor resources.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
instaCLI to manage cloud resources. - Evidence: The instructions utilize numerous subcommands (e.g.,
service add,deploy,secrets bind) to interact with the InstaCloud platform. These commands are executed within a governed agent session. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests project configuration and environment data.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads local configuration files such as
.insta/project.jsonand environment variables from.env. - Boundary markers: The skill encourages the use of the
--jsonflag to ensure structured and predictable parsing of tool outputs. - Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands, perform network requests to the InstaCloud API, and modify cloud infrastructure.
- Sanitization: The skill implements a mandatory 'agent policy' system that enforces restrictions and requires human-in-the-loop approvals for sensitive mutations and credential access.
Audit Metadata