delegate-grok
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it constructs instructions for a secondary AI (Grok) by interpolating untrusted task text directly into a command string.
- Ingestion points: Data enters through the
--taskflag or standard input in thescripts/delegate-grok.shscript, which is then passed to the Grok agent viaherdr. - Boundary markers: The script uses simple text labels such as 'Task:' and 'Rules:' to separate system instructions from the delegated content, which is insufficient to prevent an adversary from overriding the prompt context.
- Capability inventory: The script utilizes the
herdrCLI to start agents and send prompts, meaning any successfully injected instruction could potentially leverage the capabilities of the Grok agent within the shared Herdr workspace. - Sanitization: There is no escaping, filtering, or structured schema validation of the input task content before it is incorporated into the final prompt.
Audit Metadata