make-module-configuring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents the configuration of AI Agent modules (
ai-local-agent:RunLocalAIAgent) which possess an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection when processing untrusted input. - Ingestion points: The
messageandfilesfields described inai-agents.mdandai-agent-full-blueprint.jsonallow untrusted data to enter the agent context. - Boundary markers: The skill specifically instructs developers to use
restore.expect.<field>.extra.aiHelpandaiInstructionmetadata to provide the LLM with constraints, which acts as a platform-supported boundary mechanism. - Capability inventory: AI agents are documented as having the capability to invoke 'tools' consisting of full Make.com scenario flows, which can perform file operations, network requests (e.g., Discord), and data storage actions.
- Sanitization: The skill provides a structural framework (
aiInstructionandaiHelp) intended for developers to guide the AI's decision-making process safely, though it does not mandate automated sanitization scripts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill mentions the existence of the
code:ExecuteCodemodule. This is a standard platform feature for running user-defined logic and is presented in a purely informational capacity without any implementation patterns that suggest misuse. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation actively promotes secure development practices by advising against handling raw API keys or private keys directly, recommending the use of platform-managed credential request flows to ensure sensitive data is handled securely by the end user.
Audit Metadata