openspec-archive-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from local repository files and tool outputs which are then used to drive agent logic and subagent prompts.
- Ingestion points: Reads
tasks.md,spec.md, and the JSON output fromopenspec status --json(SKILL.md, Steps 2, 3, and 4). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when the agent processes the content of these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
mkdir,mv) and invoke subagents with general-purpose prompts. - Sanitization: The skill does not describe any validation or sanitization steps for the content read from the
tasks.mdor delta specs before they are used in decision-making or passed to other tools. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell commands using variables that may be influenced by external configuration or file content.
- Evidence: In Step 5, the skill executes
mkdir -p "<planningHome.changesDir>/archive"andmv "<changeRoot>" "<planningHome.changesDir>/archive/YYYY-MM-DD-<name>". If the JSON output from theopenspecCLI or the user-providednamecontains shell metacharacters (e.g.,$(),` `,;), it could lead to command injection depending on how the agent's tool execution environment handles string interpolation.
Audit Metadata