error-recovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides templates for workflows that ingest and process output from external AI models (e.g., via the
claudishCLI). This ingestion of untrusted data creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the model output contains malicious instructions that influence subsequent automated steps. - Ingestion points: Output from external models captured via the
claudishtool as documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The provided implementation patterns do not include specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The skill logic includes file system writes (
ai-docs/grok-review.md,ai-docs/partial-review.md), shell command execution viatimeoutandbash, and process management (handlingSIGINT). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization, validation, or filtering of the model-generated content is implemented in the provided examples before the data is processed or saved.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the installation of the
claudishCLI tool vianpm install -g claudishto enable multi-model functionality. It also describes querying the OpenRouter API (openrouter.ai) for credit balance checks. These are standard external resources for the documented workflow.
Audit Metadata