multi-agent-coordination

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes orchestration patterns where sub-agents process data derived from user requirements, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if untrusted data is included in instruction files.
  • Ingestion points: User requests are processed and written to files such as ai-docs/architecture-instructions.md which are subsequently read and acted upon by sub-agents.
  • Boundary markers: While the skill recommends file-based isolation to manage context, it does not mandate specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers to protect sub-agents from embedded commands in the data.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestration patterns utilize Task tool calls for delegation and Bash execution for workflow management.
  • Sanitization: The provided examples do not demonstrate explicit sanitization or validation of the data before it is passed to sub-agents.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill outlines a "Proxy Mode" that generates and executes shell commands to interact with external AI models.
  • Pattern: The instruction involves using the claudish CLI with shell variable interpolation.
  • Risk: The pattern RESULT=$(claudish --model ... --stdin <<< "$PROMPT") involves dynamic construction of shell commands based on variable prompt content, which could be exploited if inputs are not properly escaped.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the Bash tool for preparing execution environments, creating workspace directories, and invoking external CLI proxies for model interaction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 08:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — multi-agent-coordination