multi-agent-coordination
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes orchestration patterns where sub-agents process data derived from user requirements, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if untrusted data is included in instruction files.
- Ingestion points: User requests are processed and written to files such as
ai-docs/architecture-instructions.mdwhich are subsequently read and acted upon by sub-agents. - Boundary markers: While the skill recommends file-based isolation to manage context, it does not mandate specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers to protect sub-agents from embedded commands in the data.
- Capability inventory: The orchestration patterns utilize
Tasktool calls for delegation andBashexecution for workflow management. - Sanitization: The provided examples do not demonstrate explicit sanitization or validation of the data before it is passed to sub-agents.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill outlines a "Proxy Mode" that generates and executes shell commands to interact with external AI models.
- Pattern: The instruction involves using the
claudishCLI with shell variable interpolation. - Risk: The pattern
RESULT=$(claudish --model ... --stdin <<< "$PROMPT")involves dynamic construction of shell commands based on variable prompt content, which could be exploited if inputs are not properly escaped. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
Bashtool for preparing execution environments, creating workspace directories, and invoking external CLI proxies for model interaction.
Audit Metadata