stitch-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a 'baton-passing' pattern where the agent reads instructions for its next task from a local file (
.stitch/next-prompt.md), executes them, and then writes new instructions to the same file to trigger the next iteration. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker can modify the baton file. - Ingestion points: The
.stitch/next-prompt.mdfile (referenced inSKILL.mdandresources/baton-schema.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. While the file uses YAML frontmatter, there are no instructions to the agent to treat the content as untrusted or to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Writefor file modifications,Bashfor command execution, and MCP tools (stitch*:*,chrome*:*) for code generation and browser automation. - Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or validation of the instructions read from the baton file.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads HTML code and image assets from remote URLs provided by the Stitch MCP tool.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to download files fromhtmlCode.downloadUrlandscreenshot.downloadUrl(which the skill identifies as Google CDN URLs). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to facilitate the development workflow.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Step 4.5) instructs the agent to start a local server usingnpx serve site/publicvia theBashtool.
Audit Metadata