officecli-docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides setup instructions that involve downloading scripts from a remote domain and piping them directly into a shell interpreter (curl | bash and irm | iex). This pattern allows for the execution of unverified remote code on the host system without local audit or package verification.\n
- Evidence in
SKILL.md:curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bash\n - Evidence in
SKILL.md:irm https://d.officecli.ai/install.ps1 | iex\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates extensive file system interaction through the execution of shell commands using theofficeclitool, which is used to create and modify Word documents.\n - Evidence in
SKILL.md: The skill directs the agent to use verbs likecreate,add, andsetto modify Word files.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads data from external .docx files, which creates a potential vector for indirect prompt injection if the files contain malicious instructions meant for the AI agent.\n - Ingestion points:
officecli viewcommands are used to read text and HTML from documents (described inSKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: None are provided to prevent the agent from following instructions found within the document data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill includes diverse file modification capabilities as detailed across multiple scripts and instructions in
SKILL.md.\n - Sanitization: While the skill includes instructions for escaping shell metacharacters, it does not include semantic content sanitization for the agent's logic.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata