build-actions-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes content from external, potentially untrusted sources (plugin metadata and native source code) to generate its output. \n
- Ingestion points: Files like
plugin.xml,package.json,input-contract.yaml, and native source files (.java,.swift, etc.) are read to derive build actions. \n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific markers or delimiters to isolate untrusted data during processing. \n
- Capability inventory: The agent reads project files, writes configuration files to the disk, and executes validation commands. \n
- Sanitization: While the skill validates the JSON structure of its output, it does not explicitly sanitize the content extracted from source files against malicious instructions. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to run
python3 -m json.toolorjqto validate the syntax of generated JSON files. This is limited to validation purposes using well-known system utilities. \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses project configuration files such asAndroidManifest.xml,Info.plist, andgoogle-services.jsonto derive build actions. While these are necessary for the skill's primary purpose of native build configuration, they represent access to sensitive project data.
Audit Metadata