anti-slop-skill-picker
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's catalog (CATALOG.md) contains recommendations that involve downloading and executing shell scripts directly from unverified GitHub accounts, such as
git clone ... && bash install.shfor the 'talk-normal' and 'motionmaxxing' resources. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Recommends installing a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server from an external domain (sloppatterns.com) using the
npx add-mcpcommand. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The maintenance script
scripts/check-catalog.mjsusesexecFileSyncto execute shell commands likegitandnpmbased on strings parsed from the catalog file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses
scripts/detect.mjsto ingest untrusted project data (file contents and directory structures), which is then used to select tool recommendations. This creates a surface where a malicious repository could influence the agent's output. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Ingestion points:
scripts/detect.mjsreads file names, dependency lists, and file contents up to 512KB from the current repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Boundary markers: None implemented to prevent the agent from obeying instructions found within scanned project files.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Capability inventory: The skill can generate and present shell commands and installation lines for user execution.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Sanitization: Project content is not sanitized or escaped before influencing recommendation selection.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Recommends a manual installation process for the 'architecture-diagram-generator' that requires downloading a ZIP file from an unverified GitHub source and extracting it into the agent's local skills directory (~/.claude/skills/).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata