factory-lines
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to parse and analyze untrusted third-party data to automate machine configuration, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: In
references/machines.md, the agent is instructed to read CI workflows,AGENTS.md,agent.md, andREADME.mdfiles from registered repositories to discover components and configuration settings. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define clear boundary markers or specific "ignore" delimiters when processing these untrusted files, although it does provide a general warning to treat them as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The agent has extensive capabilities via the
isloCLI, including file system writes, machine build/delete operations, and network-facing trigger configurations across multiple files. - Sanitization: The instructions advise the agent to "never expose secrets, credentials, environment values, or private data" discovered in these files, but it lacks programmatic sanitization for the instructions themselves.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes heavy use of the
isloCLI to manage resources. While these are vendor-provided tools, they involve powerful operations likeislo sshandislo factory machine buildwhich execute logic based on potentially untrusted repository content. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill includes instructions to use elevated privileges for specific configuration tasks.
- Evidence: In
references/machines.md, the instructions forLocal workspace commandsand theFinalizestep includesudo install -D -m 0644 /tmp/islo-machine-context.toml /etc/islo/machine.toml. This is used to install root-owned configuration files on the host system.
Audit Metadata