9k-montage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's scaffolding script (
new-montage.sh) installs several standard NPM packages includingplaywright(for browser-based rendering),simple-icons, and various IBM Plex fonts. It also facilitates the download of whisper.cpp transcription models from Hugging Face, which is a well-known and trusted service in the AI community. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The pipeline scripts (
ingest.mjs,cut.mjs,compose.mjs,review.sh) execute common CLI utilities such asffmpeg,ffprobe,whisper-cli, andbc. These tools are essential for media processing and are invoked using safe subprocess methods (execFileSync,spawnSync) that prevent shell injection by avoiding shell parsing of arguments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill ingests and transcribes external video and audio files, there is a theoretical surface for indirect prompt injection where spoken instructions or embedded text could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the editing process. However, the skill maintains a human-in-the-loop 'plan gate' where the user must approve the editing plan before final rendering, which serves as a significant security boundary.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/ingest.mjs(transcribes source video/audio). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined for data content, but the
edit.jsoncontrol file anddocs/plan.mdapproval step provide process boundaries. - Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of
ffmpeg,whisper-cli,node, and browser-based rendering viaplaywright. - Sanitization: Path sanitization is performed in
new-montage.sh, though standard media utilities are responsible for handling binary data safely.
Audit Metadata