skills/itamaker/skills/bp/Gen Agent Trust Hub

bp

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local applications and system tools such as open, xdg-open, osascript, and pkill based on user-driven tasks. It implements internal validation logic within scripts/bp.sh to ensure that only GUI applications registered in standard system directories (e.g., /Applications or /usr/share/applications) can be launched. It explicitly refuses to execute arbitrary shell commands like rm or sh by checking them against the list of discovered desktop applications.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the local environment, including application names from .desktop files and file names from the user's home directory (e.g., ~/Downloads). Maliciously crafted file names could potentially influence the agent's behavior when it processes the output of the shortcut tool.\n
  • Ingestion points: The scripts/bp.sh script reads .desktop files to discover applications and uses find and stat to list files in the user's Downloads, Desktop, and Documents folders.\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit boundary markers for data returned by the shell script to the agent.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for file system searching (find), file writing (appending to the TSV store and creating files in ~/Documents/bp), and process/command execution (launch, stop).\n
  • Sanitization: scripts/bp.sh validates aliases, URL schemes, and target existence. It filters out system and shell processes from its stop (quit) command to prevent accidental system disruption.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 6, 2026, 04:07 AM