vibekanban
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documentation and configuration files explicitly promote and enable high-privilege execution modes for AI agents.
- Agent profiles in
references/configuration.mdinclude flags such asdangerously_skip_permissions: true,yolo: true, andsandbox: "danger-full-access". - These configurations are designed to bypass safety confirmations and prompts, granting the agents autonomous system access.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute arbitrary shell commands and scripts on the host system.
references/core-features.mddescribes the use of 'Setup Scripts', 'Dev Server Scripts', and 'Cleanup Scripts' (e.g.,npm install,cargo build) that run within git worktrees.- An integrated PTY-backed terminal with full shell support is provided within the workspace interface as noted in
references/workspaces.md. - The MCP server integration allows external clients to execute workspace and issue management commands, including script updates.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to download and execute code from external sources.
SKILL.mdandreferences/getting-started.mdprovide commands to install the core application vianpx vibe-kanbanandvibe-kanban-web-companionvianpm.- It encourages integration with third-party CLI tools such as the GitHub CLI (
gh) and Azure CLI (az). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill allows for the dynamic modification and execution of agent commands.
references/configuration.mddetails how users can providebase_command_overrideandadditional_paramsto change how the underlying agent CLI is invoked at runtime.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data that could be used to influence the behavior of the autonomous agents.
- Ingestion points: Task descriptions, code review comments, and arbitrary file attachments (logs, specs, archives) processed in
SKILL.mdandreferences/core-features.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to prevent agents from following instructions embedded within these data sources.
- Capability inventory: The agents have broad capabilities including file system modification, git operations (merge, rebase, push), and execution of arbitrary scripts as described in
references/core-features.mdandreferences/workspaces.md. - Sanitization: No evidence is provided regarding the sanitization or validation of input data before it is passed to the agent's context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata