bilibili-transcript

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a Whisper GGML model file from a third-party mirror of Hugging Face if the file is not already present in the user's cache.
  • Evidence: In scripts/bili_transcript.py, the constant HF_MIRROR_BASE points to hf-mirror.com, and the ensure_whisper_model function performs the download using urllib.request.urlopen.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script executes several external command-line tools to process audio files and perform transcription.
  • Evidence: scripts/bili_transcript.py calls subprocess.run() for ffmpeg, afconvert (on macOS), whisper-cli, and whisper. These executions use argument lists rather than raw shell strings, which is a secure practice to prevent shell command injection.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data (subtitles and transcribed text) sourced from external Bilibili videos, which could potentially contain malicious instructions aimed at the agent.
  • Ingestion points: The functions fetch_subtitle_body and whisper_fallback in scripts/bili_transcript.py ingest content from the Bilibili API and transcription tools respectively.
  • Boundary markers: Not present in the raw data, but the SKILL.md instructions explicitly tell the agent to deliver the text to the user without altering the original meaning.
  • Capability inventory: The script maintains the ability to write to the local filesystem, perform network operations, and execute system commands.
  • Sanitization: The video identifier (BVID) is strictly validated using the regular expression BV[0-9A-Za-z]{10} before any processing occurs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 08:43 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bilibili-transcript