bilibili-transcript
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a Whisper GGML model file from a third-party mirror of Hugging Face if the file is not already present in the user's cache.
- Evidence: In
scripts/bili_transcript.py, the constantHF_MIRROR_BASEpoints tohf-mirror.com, and theensure_whisper_modelfunction performs the download usingurllib.request.urlopen. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script executes several external command-line tools to process audio files and perform transcription.
- Evidence:
scripts/bili_transcript.pycallssubprocess.run()forffmpeg,afconvert(on macOS),whisper-cli, andwhisper. These executions use argument lists rather than raw shell strings, which is a secure practice to prevent shell command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data (subtitles and transcribed text) sourced from external Bilibili videos, which could potentially contain malicious instructions aimed at the agent.
- Ingestion points: The functions
fetch_subtitle_bodyandwhisper_fallbackinscripts/bili_transcript.pyingest content from the Bilibili API and transcription tools respectively. - Boundary markers: Not present in the raw data, but the
SKILL.mdinstructions explicitly tell the agent to deliver the text to the user without altering the original meaning. - Capability inventory: The script maintains the ability to write to the local filesystem, perform network operations, and execute system commands.
- Sanitization: The video identifier (BVID) is strictly validated using the regular expression
BV[0-9A-Za-z]{10}before any processing occurs.
Audit Metadata