agent-tools
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill repeatedly instructs the user to download and execute a script from a remote server using the
curl | shpattern. - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.md,references/authentication.md, andreferences/cli-reference.mdusing the URLhttps://cli.inference.sh. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions encourage piping unverified remote content directly into the system shell, bypassing manual code review.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
beltCLI tool, which the skill is designed to manage, possesses a "Local File Uploads" feature that automatically reads and transmits local file contents to a remote cloud environment when a path is provided in the input arguments. - Evidence: Documented in
SKILL.mdandreferences/running-apps.mdunder the "Local File Uploads" section. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves processing external input files and performing network operations, which creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Local input files (JSON/text) and media files passed via the
--inputargument inSKILL.mdandreferences/running-apps.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not suggest the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
beltCLI which supports network uploads, file reads, and interaction with various AI models and social media APIs. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or content sanitization before the data is processed by the CLI tool.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata