ai-image-generation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends the installation of external components via
npx skills add, specifically targetingbelt-sh/cliand various sub-skills under theinference-sh/skillsGitHub repository. It also links to external documentation and installation guides hosted onraw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
beltCLI utility for its primary functionality. It provides instructions for authentication (belt login), listing applications (belt app list), and executing specific image generation models (belt app run <model> --input ...). Theallowed-toolsfrontmatter correctly scopes access to this specific command pattern. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests user-supplied text to pass to external image generation models.
- Ingestion points: User input is interpolated into the
--inputJSON payload for thebeltcommand (found inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON formatting to encapsulate user prompts, which provides a natural boundary for the external command.
- Capability inventory: The skill is limited to shell execution of the
belttool via theBashtool. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization shown in the markdown examples, but the use of JSON structures minimizes the risk of command injection within the local shell context.
Audit Metadata