competitor-teardown
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and directs the user to fetch installation instructions from an external GitHub repository (inference-sh/skills).
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructions direct the user to install a third-party CLI tool (belt-sh/cli) via npx, which executes code from an external registry.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested via tavily/search-assistant, tavily/extract, exa/search, and infsh/agent-browser (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing flow.
- Capability inventory: The skill is allowed to use Bash(belt *), providing access to a suite of search, browsing, and execution tools (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the retrieved web content is provided.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a Python execution tool (infsh/python-executor) to run code for generating positioning maps, involving runtime execution of script templates (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata