gepetto
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's external review protocol defined in
references/external-review.mdconstructs shell commands for thegeminiandcodexCLIs using command substitution ($(cat ...)) inside double-quoted strings. This pattern allows any shell metacharacters or commands embedded in theclaude-plan.mdfile to be expanded and executed by the local bash shell. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the internet during its research phase (
references/research-protocol.md). Evidence: 1. Ingestion points:WebSearchfindings are collected intoclaude-research.md. 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or ignore instructions are used when combining research into the specification. 3. Capability inventory: The agent has bash execution capabilities used in Step 10 and file-write capabilities throughout the workflow. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external content is performed before it flows into the implementation plan and shell commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
README.mdandreferences/external-review.mdreferences the use of CLI tools from Google and OpenAI to perform plan reviews.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata