itsol-functional-planning

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources (such as repository code and user requests) to generate implementation plans and delegate tasks. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a target repository could influence the agent's planning or subsequent execution steps.
  • Ingestion points: The workflow described in SKILL.md and references/03-deep-planning-interview.md explicitly gathers context from user requests, repository code, and local policy files to define scope and behavior.
  • Boundary markers: The skill incorporates several mitigation patterns, including 'Rubber Duck Review' (isolated read-only review in references/02-plan-review.md) and a requirement to validate evidence before accepting task completion (SKILL.md). However, it lacks explicit delimiting or instruction-ignoring markers when interpolating untrusted request data into the Business and Technical Plan templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including writing plan files, delegating tasks to subagents via itsol-subagent-workflow, and executing repository-defined verification commands as part of the TDD (Test-Driven Development) process described in references/05-technical-plan.md.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated sanitization, escaping, or filtering of external content before it is processed or used to generate the Task Breakdown for execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 02:31 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — itsol-functional-planning