browser-act
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute
browser-act get-skills coreand follow "operational directives" contained in the command's output. This creates a multi-step chain where external tool output dictates the agent's next instructions, establishing an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points: Output from the
browser-actCLI tool in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present; the skill explicitly forbids the agent from truncating output, which could otherwise act as a safety boundary.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
Bashtool to execute browser interactions, navigation, and network capture. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the directives received from the tool output is specified.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions use authoritative directives such as "Do NOT skip this step" and "Do NOT truncate the output" to override the agent's default processing and context management procedures.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's metadata instructs the user to install the
browser-act-clipackage from PyPI using theuvtool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill functions by executing shell commands through a dedicated CLI tool to perform browser automation tasks.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documents the transmission of captcha challenge images to an external API (
browseract.com) for verification assistance. Although limited to challenge images, this constitutes a network operation to a non-whitelisted domain.
Audit Metadata