marketing-carousel-growth-engine
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several internal shell scripts (
generate-slides.sh,publish-carousel.sh,check-analytics.sh) and CLI tools includingplaywrightanduvto execute its workflow. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a persistence mechanism by instructing the agent to 'Self-Schedule' its own recurring execution using system task schedulers like cron, allowing it to maintain a daily publishing cycle without human oversight.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it scrapes arbitrary website URLs using Playwright and uses the extracted content to drive its autonomous decision-making.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from external URLs via
analyze-web.jsand Playwright. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands within the scraped website data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute local scripts, write files (
learnings.json), and perform network requests to external APIs. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any logic for escaping or validating the content extracted from external websites before it influences the agent's content generation pipeline.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers the download and installation of the Chromium browser binary through the
playwright install chromiumcommand. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations to
api.upload-post.com, a non-whitelisted third-party domain, to transmit generated content and retrieve analytics data.
Audit Metadata