marketing-carousel-growth-engine

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several internal shell scripts (generate-slides.sh, publish-carousel.sh, check-analytics.sh) and CLI tools including playwright and uv to execute its workflow.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a persistence mechanism by instructing the agent to 'Self-Schedule' its own recurring execution using system task schedulers like cron, allowing it to maintain a daily publishing cycle without human oversight.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it scrapes arbitrary website URLs using Playwright and uses the extracted content to drive its autonomous decision-making.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested from external URLs via analyze-web.js and Playwright.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands within the scraped website data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute local scripts, write files (learnings.json), and perform network requests to external APIs.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks any logic for escaping or validating the content extracted from external websites before it influences the agent's content generation pipeline.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers the download and installation of the Chromium browser binary through the playwright install chromium command.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations to api.upload-post.com, a non-whitelisted third-party domain, to transmit generated content and retrieve analytics data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 10, 2026, 02:36 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — marketing-carousel-growth-engine