openspec-propose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes JSON data from the
openspecCLI and reads contents of previously created artifact files to generate new ones. This structure is susceptible to indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the CLI output or dependency files. - Ingestion points: Data is ingested from
openspec status --jsonandopenspec instructions --jsoncommands, and by reading completed dependency artifacts inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or boundary markers used to separate the external data from the skill's instructions in
SKILL.md. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
bashfor CLI interaction,TodoWritefor progress tracking, and file-writing capabilities to create artifacts as described inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or schema validation is performed on the data ingested from the CLI or files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands (
openspec new change "<name>") using a name derived from user input. While the skill instructs the agent to convert input to kebab-case, this pattern poses a potential command injection risk if the agent fails to properly sanitize the user-provided description before passing it to the shell.
Audit Metadata