herdr-subagents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a callback mechanism that ingests data from external files and injects it directly into the agent's instruction stream to trigger new actions.
- Ingestion points: The extension script
extensions/herdr-callbacks.tsmonitors the~/.pi/agent/callbacks/directory and reads the contents of any file ending in.done. - Boundary markers: The injected message is prefixed with a bracketed source tag (e.g.,
[subagent-callback:file.done]), which provides minimal separation between the system's context and the potentially untrusted external data. - Capability inventory: The parent agent possesses high-privilege capabilities including the
Bashtool and the ability to control other agent processes via theherdrCLI. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the content of the callback files before they are passed to the agent's steering mechanism via the
pi.sendUserMessagefunction using thedeliverAs: "steer"option. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to perform extensive system operations and process management via the command line, which could be abused if the agent is misled by subagent callbacks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects the agent to useherdrCLI tools for pane management (herdr pane split), agent orchestration (herdr agent start/prompt), and filesystem manipulation (mkdir,cp).
Audit Metadata