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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted content from the public web, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Web content enters the agent context via multiple tools including
WebFetch,curl,lightpanda,agent-browser, andPlaywright MCP, as described inSKILL.mdandreferences/extraction-patterns.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not mandate the use of explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when presenting untrusted content to the LLM.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including shell command execution, file system writes for saving extracted content, and interactive browser automation (clicks, form fills, and JavaScript evaluation).
- Sanitization: The skill reduces the attack surface by instructing the agent to strip boilerplate (nav, ads, footers) and to convert content into Markdown or Semantic Tree formats rather than raw HTML.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In
references/tool-setup.md, the skill provides instructions to download the Lightpanda browser binary from GitHub. The provided shell script includes a robust security measure that verifies the file's SHA-256 integrity using Python before the binary is installed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing various command-line utilities (
curl,lightpanda,agent-browser) to fetch and interact with web pages. These are within the intended functional scope of the skill. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses browser-level JavaScript execution (the
evaluatetool) to extract structured data from pages at runtime. While this is a standard feature of browsing tools, it represents the execution of dynamic logic within the browser context.
Audit Metadata