cross-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled Python script (scripts/snapshot.py) to capture the state of the Git repository before and after the review process. This script uses subprocess.run with argument lists (avoiding shell interpolation) to interact with the local git binary.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes external CLI tools (codex, claude) to perform the code review. These are established, well-known developer tools. The instructions explicitly warn against using eval or pasting repository text directly into shell commands to prevent command injection.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes code, diffs, and untracked files which are external and potentially untrusted data. This content is passed to a reviewer model, creating an attack surface where malicious code could attempt to influence the reviewer's findings.
  • Ingestion points: Ingests repository content, diffs, and untracked file listings during the 'Prepare' and 'Review' phases (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Uses a dedicated prompt template (references/reviewer-prompt.md) to scope the reviewer model's task and enforce read-only constraints.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system access (reading/writing to a temporary artifact directory) and shell command execution (git, python, and model CLIs).
  • Sanitization: The skill implements a mandatory 'Triage' phase where the agent is strictly instructed to verify every finding against the actual code, types, and invariants, which serves as a critical human-in-the-loop/agent-validation check against malicious or incorrect model outputs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 4, 2026, 02:14 AM