skills/ivanrvpereira/.agents/sentry/Gen Agent Trust Hub

sentry

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads the Sentry authentication token from the user's home directory and sends it to Sentry's API to authenticate requests. This is the intended behavior for a Sentry integration tool.
  • Evidence:
  • lib/auth.js reads ~/.sentryclirc using readFileSync and extracts the token value via regular expression.
  • lib/auth.js includes this token in the Authorization: Bearer header for all fetch requests to https://sentry.io/api/0.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from an external source (Sentry) that often contains attacker-controlled or untrusted content, such as error messages, request bodies, and stack traces. If this content contains instructions for the AI agent, it could lead to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Sentry API responses fetched in scripts/fetch-event.js, scripts/fetch-issue.js, scripts/list-issues.js, scripts/search-events.js, and scripts/search-logs.js.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The fetched content (e.g., event messages, exception values, and breadcrumbs) is formatted and displayed to the agent context without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for network operations to the Sentry API and reading local configuration files.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The scripts render retrieved metadata and message strings directly into the terminal output or JSON response for the agent to process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 02:31 PM