plan-eng-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses
evalandsourceon the output of local binaries (such asgstack-slugandgstack-repo-mode) located in~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/. This allows the skill to dynamically modify environment variables and the shell state at runtime based on the execution of these scripts. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Repository contents, including implementation plans, design documents, and branch diffs, are sent to external services (OpenAI Codex via the
codexCLI) and telemetry servers. While this is part of the skill's primary functionality (the "outside voice" review and usage tracking), it involves exporting potentially sensitive code and project metadata to remote endpoints. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and analyzes untrusted data directly from the repository being reviewed, which could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Files are read via
Read,Grep, andGlobtools; repository history and diffs are ingested throughBashcommands likegit logandgit diff. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack consistent boundary markers (e.g., XML tags or clear delimiters) when interpolating file content into prompts for the primary review or the external Codex review.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash(for subprocess execution),Write(for modifying project files andCLAUDE.md), andWebSearch. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the repository content before it is processed by the LLM or external agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a wide range of shell commands for project state detection, configuration management, and session handling. This includes interacting with local
gstackbinaries and performing git operations likegit commitandgit add.
Audit Metadata