skills/ivansamartino/gstack/retro/Gen Agent Trust Hub

retro

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The preamble performs dynamic code execution by using eval on the output of ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-slug and source on the output of ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-repo-mode. This allows the skill to execute shell commands generated at runtime by these local utilities.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on a set of local binaries located in ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/. These are executed during the preamble and at various stages of the retrospective workflow. Examples include gstack-config, gstack-update-check, gstack-telemetry-log, and gstack-learnings-search. It also uses the open command to launch external URLs in the browser.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs update checks via gstack-update-check and includes functionality for an "inline upgrade flow". It also features an "Artifacts Sync" mechanism that can publish project artifacts to a private GitHub repository using gstack-brain-sync.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Usage data, including skill identifiers and repo names, is logged to ~/.gstack/analytics/skill-usage.jsonl. The skill also uses gstack-telemetry-log to send event-type data, outcomes, and session IDs to a remote service, which represents a data exfiltration surface.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from git log output, CHANGELOG, TODOS.md, and Various session logs to generate its analytical narrative. It possesses a high attack surface as it lacks boundary markers or sanitization logic while maintaining access to powerful tools like Bash and Write.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 8, 2026, 09:19 AM