mage-ai-pipelines

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The example configuration in io_config.yaml includes a hardcoded password dev_password for the development profile. While intended for local testing, hardcoding credentials in documentation templates is a suboptimal security practice.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration and deployment examples reference official container images for Mage AI and PostgreSQL.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides examples of shell commands using curl to interact with the Mage AI API for management tasks like triggering runs and backfills.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The notify_slack_on_failure.py callback template demonstrates sending pipeline status and error metadata to an external Slack webhook URL.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of pipelines that process data from external sources like Kafka and S3, which introduces a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data loader blocks fetching records from S3, Kafka, and PostgreSQL (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the provided instructions and code templates do not specify delimiters or warnings to isolate untrusted external content within the agent's context.
  • Capability inventory: The pipeline blocks possess capabilities for database operations, file system exports, and external network requests via callbacks (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the provided code snippets demonstrate data interpolation and processing without explicit validation or escaping of content retrieved from external sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 09:00 PM