mage-ai-pipelines
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The example configuration in
io_config.yamlincludes a hardcoded passworddev_passwordfor the development profile. While intended for local testing, hardcoding credentials in documentation templates is a suboptimal security practice. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration and deployment examples reference official container images for Mage AI and PostgreSQL.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides examples of shell commands using
curlto interact with the Mage AI API for management tasks like triggering runs and backfills. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
notify_slack_on_failure.pycallback template demonstrates sending pipeline status and error metadata to an external Slack webhook URL. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of pipelines that process data from external sources like Kafka and S3, which introduces a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data loader blocks fetching records from S3, Kafka, and PostgreSQL (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the provided instructions and code templates do not specify delimiters or warnings to isolate untrusted external content within the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: The pipeline blocks possess capabilities for database operations, file system exports, and external network requests via callbacks (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; the provided code snippets demonstrate data interpolation and processing without explicit validation or escaping of content retrieved from external sources.
Audit Metadata