agenthub
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/result_ranker.pyutilizessubprocess.run(eval_cmd, shell=True)to execute evaluation benchmarks. Theeval_cmdis retrieved from a session-specificconfig.yamlfile populated during initialization. This allows for the execution of arbitrary shell commands in the repository's context. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By design, the skill allows users to configure evaluation commands (
eval_cmd) that are executed during the ranking phase. This provides a surface for remote code execution if the configuration is sourced from or influenced by untrusted external data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The hub coordinator agent processes markdown files written by sub-agents to the
.agenthub/board/directory. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious or compromised sub-agents could embed instructions into their progress or result reports to influence the coordinator's ranking or merge decisions. - Ingestion points: The coordinator agent reads contents from
.agenthub/board/results/and.agenthub/board/progress/(referenced inagents/hub-coordinator.md). - Boundary markers: The system does not implement explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" delimiters when the coordinator reads agent-generated markdown.
- Capability inventory: The coordinator has access to git tools and is instructed to execute the
result_ranker.pyscript, which triggers shell commands. - Sanitization: While
board_manager.pysanitizes author names for use in filenames, there is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the body content of the markdown posts. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/dry_run.pyscript dynamically executes other Python files within the skill package usingsys.executableto verify that their--helpmenus exit correctly, which is a form of internal dynamic code execution.
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