autoresearch-agent

SUSPICIOUS: the skill's capabilities largely match its stated purpose, and I found no clear credential harvesting or off-purpose exfiltration. The main concerns are autonomous indefinite modification/command execution and medium install-trust issues from unpinned same-org distribution paths.

No clear evidence of stealthy malware (exfiltration/persistence) is visible in the fragment. However, the code contains a significant and concrete security risk: it executes a user-provided evaluation command with `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)` directly from the CLI argument --eval, enabling arbitrary command execution. Optional evaluator copying and branch creation further expand supply-chain/code-introduction risk, but their safety cannot be confirmed from this snippet.

No direct evidence of embedded malware (e.g., exfiltration, backdoors, persistence) or intentional obfuscation is present in this module’s logic. However, it has a critical supply-chain/sandbox-break risk: it executes a shell-interpreted command (shell=True) taken directly from experiment_dir/config.cfg (evaluate_cmd). If config.cfg (or experiment_dir contents) can be influenced by an attacker, this becomes arbitrary command execution in the project directory. The script also performs destructive git resets on failure/timeout, increasing operational impact. Recommend strict validation/whitelisting of evaluate_cmd, avoiding shell=True (use argv lists), and running evaluations in a heavily restricted environment (e.g., container/sandbox) with immutable configs.