browser-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements web scraping workflows that ingest untrusted data from external websites while possessing high-privilege browser capabilities such as form filling and file downloads. This combination allows for potential manipulation of agent behavior via instructions embedded in processed web content.
  • Ingestion points: page.goto and various extraction recipes in references/data_extraction_recipes.md and SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks instructions for using delimiters or negative constraints to prevent the agent from following instructions found in scraped content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Playwright library to perform clicks, fill inputs, and handle downloads as seen in references/playwright_browser_api.md and scripts/form_automation_builder.py.
  • Sanitization: A cleaning utility in references/data_extraction_recipes.md handles whitespace and zero-width characters but does not sanitize against prompt injection patterns.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The toolkit includes scripts designed to dynamically generate Python source code for web automation tasks based on user-provided parameters.
  • Evidence: scripts/form_automation_builder.py and scripts/scraping_toolkit.py use string templates and text wrapping to construct executable scripts.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The script generation tools automatically modify file permissions to make the resulting Python scripts executable by the system.
  • Evidence: os.chmod(output_path, 0o755) is called in scripts/form_automation_builder.py (line 330) and scripts/scraping_toolkit.py (line 195).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 02:33 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — browser-automation