engineering-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
self-improving-agentplugin contains features that ingest data from potentially untrusted sources, such as shell tool outputs and project memory files, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The
error-capture.shhook inself-improving-agent/hooks/processesCLAUDE_TOOL_OUTPUT, and thememory-analyst.mdagent readsMEMORY.mdand associated topic files from~/.claude/projects/. - Boundary markers: The error capture hook wraps ingested data in
<error-detected>tags, but does not provide explicit instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands. The memory analyst agent does not use specific delimiters for its input files. - Capability inventory: The agent environment includes capabilities for shell command execution, file system modification, and network access, which could be targeted by a successful injection.
- Sanitization: No robust sanitization or safety filtering is performed on the ingested content beyond basic truncation in the error hook.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation and installation guides recommend using external tools to download and execute code from unverified sources.
- Evidence:
README.mdsuggests installation vianpx ai-agent-skills install alirezarezvani/claude-skills/engineering-team. - Details: These tools download and execute code from a repository managed by an individual user who is not part of a verified trusted organization, introducing a potential supply chain risk.
Audit Metadata