container-hardening

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data such as container manifests, Docker/Kubernetes configuration files, and scanner outputs which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context during the Inventory (R1) and Review (R2-R3) phases in SKILL.md via file reading and tool execution outputs.
  • Boundary markers: The skill implements a robust boundary rule in SKILL.md (Rule of Engagement 8), explicitly instructing the agent to treat evidence as data only and to ignore embedded commands or directives.
  • Capability inventory: The skill leverages system tools including docker, kubectl, trivy, hadolint, and grep across its operational instructions as documented in SKILL.md and platforms.md.
  • Sanitization: The instructions explicitly mandate that any instructions found in the analyzed data should be reported as findings rather than being executed, providing clear guidance on prompt isolation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 22, 2026, 01:28 AM