xlsx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Runtime Compilation and Process Injection
- File:
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file and compiled usinggccat runtime to create a shared library (lo_socket_shim.so). - The resulting library is then injected into the LibreOffice (
soffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This technique is used to bypass environment restrictions on Unix sockets but is a high-risk capability that can be repurposed for malicious process interference. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistent Macro Installation
- File:
scripts/recalc.pycreates and writes a StarBasic macro to the user's permanent LibreOffice configuration directory (~/.config/libreoffice/on Linux or~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/on macOS). This code persists outside the AI agent session and will be executed by LibreOffice during recalculation tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: System Tool Invocation
- The skill utilizes
subprocess.runto execute various system tools includingsoffice,gcc, andgitacross multiple script files (scripts/recalc.py,scripts/office/soffice.py,scripts/office/validators/redlining.py). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface
- Ingestion points: Spreadsheet data enters the agent context through
pandas.read_excelandopenpyxl.load_workbookinSKILL.mdexamples and user scripts. - Boundary markers: None present. The skill does not provide instructions to ignore or delimit embedded natural language instructions within the spreadsheet data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including file system access, network potential through subprocess-invoked tools, and dynamic code generation.
- Sanitization: None. Data from files is processed as-is, which could allow a malicious spreadsheet to influence subsequent agent actions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata