blockchain-infrastructure

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Jul 8, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

  • Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.70). Multiple entries point to a non-standard domain that mimics a known MEV service (boost-relay-flashbots.net) and a direct Azure blob path for geth binaries — domains and direct binary hosts like these can be used to distribute unvetted/typosquatted executables and therefore look suspicious.

MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

  • Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly includes crypto transaction signing and broadcast capabilities: it documents use of KMS/HSM/Fireblocks for "tx signing", Web3Signer (remote signing via REST API / Docker), deploy pipelines that broadcast transactions (forge --broadcast), references to deployer_key/$MAINNET_PK (from KMS), multi-sig signing gates, and fee recipient addresses for validators/MEV. These are specific blockchain/crypto signing and transaction submission tools (not generic automation), so the skill grants direct financial execution authority for crypto assets.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill instructs creating/modifying system service files and copying binaries to privileged locations (e.g., /etc/systemd/system, /usr/local/bin) and invoking systemctl/SSH, which require elevated privileges and directly change the host system state.

Issues (3)

E005
CRITICAL

Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

W009
MEDIUM

Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Jul 8, 2026, 12:23 PM
Issues
3
Security Audit — snyk — blockchain-infrastructure