bun
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references downloads from well-known and official sources including Docker images from the official Bun organization (
oven/bun), GitHub Actions (oven-sh/setup-bun), and deployment tools for platforms like Fly.io and Vercel. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Implementation patterns in
SKILL.mdandreferences/bun-essentials.mddemonstrate and encourage the use of shell execution viaBun.shell($),Bun.spawnSync, andBun.spawnfor tasks like file management, build processes, and deployment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Eight reference files (including
architecture-patterns.md,code-organization.md, anddeployment-pipelines.md) contain hundreds of identical repetitive sections described as 'extremely dense technical specifications' for 'Staff+ Engineers'. This deceptive and voluminous content can lead to context drowning, potentially causing the agent to ignore critical instructions or safety guardrails. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill introduces an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface (Category 8) through its provided code templates:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via HTTP Request objects in
src/index.tsandsrc/router.ts, as well as filename arguments insrc/utils/file-storage.ts. - Boundary markers: Explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the ingested data are absent in the examples.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses sensitive capabilities including
Bun.spawnSync(['rm', path])for file deletion andBun.shell($) for build and deployment scripts. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization logic is present in the provided templates to prevent malicious input from influencing command execution or file operations.
Audit Metadata