skills/j4flmao/agent-skills/bun/Gen Agent Trust Hub

bun

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references downloads from well-known and official sources including Docker images from the official Bun organization (oven/bun), GitHub Actions (oven-sh/setup-bun), and deployment tools for platforms like Fly.io and Vercel.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Implementation patterns in SKILL.md and references/bun-essentials.md demonstrate and encourage the use of shell execution via Bun.shell ($), Bun.spawnSync, and Bun.spawn for tasks like file management, build processes, and deployment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Eight reference files (including architecture-patterns.md, code-organization.md, and deployment-pipelines.md) contain hundreds of identical repetitive sections described as 'extremely dense technical specifications' for 'Staff+ Engineers'. This deceptive and voluminous content can lead to context drowning, potentially causing the agent to ignore critical instructions or safety guardrails.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill introduces an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface (Category 8) through its provided code templates:
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via HTTP Request objects in src/index.ts and src/router.ts, as well as filename arguments in src/utils/file-storage.ts.
  • Boundary markers: Explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the ingested data are absent in the examples.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses sensitive capabilities including Bun.spawnSync(['rm', path]) for file deletion and Bun.shell ($) for build and deployment scripts.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization logic is present in the provided templates to prevent malicious input from influencing command execution or file operations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 06:46 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bun