data-pipeline-cicd
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains eight unreferenced files in the
references/directory (e.g.,architecture-patterns.md,testing-strategies.md) that contain over 1,200 repetitive, AI-generated technical sections. This 'context stuffing' is a common adversarial technique used to overwhelm an agent's context window and bypass system instructions or safety guardrails. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted SQL code for migrations and linting, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
transform/models/**/*.sqlandmigrations/*.sql(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present in example configurations to distinguish instructions from data.
- Capability inventory: Shell access for package management, database operations via
dbtandsnowsql, and cloud storage synchronization viaaws s3(SKILL.md,references/sql-linting-and-testing.md). - Sanitization: No mechanisms for filtering or escaping embedded Jinja or SQL commands are described.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Several CI/CD workflow examples and reference documents (e.g.,
references/dbt-ci-cd-pipeline.md) rely onpip install -r transform/requirements.txt. Since therequirements.txtfile is not included in the skill package, its contents are unverifiable and pose a supply chain risk.
Audit Metadata