data-schema-registry
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains thousands of lines of repetitive filler text across eight reference files, which acts as a form of context stuffing or obfuscation.
- Files such as
references/architecture-patterns.md,references/security-best-practices.md, andreferences/performance-optimization.mdeach contain 150 identical or near-identical sections of boilerplate regarding kernel interactions, eBPF, and Zero Trust architectures. - This technique can be used to exhaust an AI agent's context window or obscure malicious patterns from human review.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through the processing of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and process schemas from user-provided files and external Schema Registry subjects (
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack clear delimiters or specific directives for the agent to treat schema content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network capabilities via
curland system capabilities for Docker deployment and CI/CD script execution (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined to inspect external schemas for embedded malicious instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references downloads and dependencies from established and reputable sources.
- Documentation includes pulling official Docker images from Confluent (
confluentinc/cp-schema-registry). - CI/CD workflow examples reference standard Python libraries like
requests,avro, andfastavrofrom official registries. - These references are documented neutrally and are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of schema management.
Audit Metadata