data-schema-registry

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains thousands of lines of repetitive filler text across eight reference files, which acts as a form of context stuffing or obfuscation.
  • Files such as references/architecture-patterns.md, references/security-best-practices.md, and references/performance-optimization.md each contain 150 identical or near-identical sections of boilerplate regarding kernel interactions, eBPF, and Zero Trust architectures.
  • This technique can be used to exhaust an AI agent's context window or obscure malicious patterns from human review.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through the processing of untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and process schemas from user-provided files and external Schema Registry subjects (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack clear delimiters or specific directives for the agent to treat schema content as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network capabilities via curl and system capabilities for Docker deployment and CI/CD script execution (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined to inspect external schemas for embedded malicious instructions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references downloads and dependencies from established and reputable sources.
  • Documentation includes pulling official Docker images from Confluent (confluentinc/cp-schema-registry).
  • CI/CD workflow examples reference standard Python libraries like requests, avro, and fastavro from official registries.
  • These references are documented neutrally and are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of schema management.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 8, 2026, 12:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — data-schema-registry