devops-platform-engineering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes architecture for a developer portal (Backstage) that ingests data from external sources, which is a known vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
references/internal-developer-portal.mdoutlines how the portal fetches service metadata (catalog-info.yaml) from external GitHub repositories. - Boundary markers: The provided configuration examples do not include explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to disregard instructions potentially embedded within the fetched external data.
- Capability inventory:
SKILL.mdandreferences/internal-developer-portal.mddescribe workflows where the agent can initiate infrastructure provisioning, repository creation, and database setup via custom actions and templates. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the ingested metadata in the illustrative examples.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill folder includes eight documentation files (e.g.,
references/architecture-patterns.md,references/security-best-practices.md) that are not listed in the primarySKILL.mdreference section and consist of approximately 150 repeated sections of filler text. - Evidence: Files such as
references/deployment-pipelines.mdrepeat the same generic technical paragraph hundreds of times. This redundant content appears to be low-quality bloat that could exhaust an agent's context window or mislead the agent regarding its own knowledge base depth.
Audit Metadata