The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data (vision documents, stakeholder wishlist, market analysis).
Ingestion points: Workflow Step 1 in SKILL.md instructs the agent to collect various external documents such as 'Product vision and strategy documents' and 'Stakeholder priority lists'.
Boundary markers: There are no instructions to the agent to treat these inputs as data only or to ignore embedded instructions. Delimiters are absent during the ingestion phase.
Capability inventory: The agent environment typically allows execution of shell commands and file system modifications (referenced in SKILL.md production considerations), which could be abused if an injected instruction is followed.
Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is defined in the skill logic.
[OBFUSCATION]: Several reference files contain massive amounts of repetitive, boilerplate technical content that provides no value to the primary skill purpose.
Evidence: Files such as references/architecture-patterns.md, references/security-best-practices.md, and others contain ~150 sections each of near-identical text concerning 'Zero Trust', 'kernel interaction', and 'eBPF'.
Risk: This constitutes context-stuffing which may be intended to dilute system prompt constraints or hide malicious instructions among the noise, making manual auditing significantly more difficult.

planning-create-roadmap