solution-architecture
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data in the form of user-supplied requirements and constraints to generate architecture recommendations and Architecture Decision Records (ADRs).
- Ingestion points: Requirements, constraints, and context gathered from the user in Step 1 of the workflow (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not specify delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the user-supplied data.
- Capability inventory: The skill instructs the agent to write files to the local file system, specifically ADRs in
docs/decisions/and diagrams indocs/architecture/(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; there is no mention of filtering or escaping user input before it is used to generate output files.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: No evidence of direct prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, or instructions to override agent safety guardrails was found in the skill instructions.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: No commands for accessing sensitive system files (e.g., SSH keys, credentials) or unauthorized network exfiltration patterns were detected. The included code snippets are benign examples.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: No remote script downloads or dynamic execution of external code were found. The skill relies on local reference files for its logic.
- [OBFUSCATION]: Several reference files (e.g.,
references/architecture-patterns.md,references/performance-optimization.md) contain 150 sections of highly repetitive technical boilerplate. While unusual and potentially deceptive in nature, no hidden malicious commands or obfuscated URLs were detected within the repeated text.
Audit Metadata