drawio
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
scripts/drawio-start.shandscripts/drawio-export.shto execute shell commands, manage system processes viapgrep, and launch the draw.io desktop binary with specific command-line arguments. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The core functionality in
scripts/drawio-eval.mjsinvolves evaluating arbitrary JavaScript strings inside the draw.io Electron application's renderer process using the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP). This allows the agent to execute code at runtime to manipulate the diagram editor. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from diagram files and labels which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during inspection tasks.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads diagram content through
D.dump(),D.find(), andD.info()inscripts/drawio-helpers.jsandscripts/drawio-eval.mjs. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or mechanisms to treat diagram labels as untrusted data or to ignore instructions embedded within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the filesystem (
D.save()), execute scripts within draw.io, and perform network requests to the local debugging port. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering was found for the text labels retrieved from diagrams before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata