gimp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the activation of GIMP's Script-Fu server, creating an unauthenticated TCP listener on
127.0.0.1:10008. This server accepts and executes arbitrary Python or Scheme code, allowing any process on the local machine to execute commands with the user's privileges within the GIMP environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file
scripts/gimp_client.pydynamically generates a Python bootstrap script at runtime. It uses theexec(compile(...))pattern to execute agent-generated scripts within GIMP's internal Python interpreter, bypassing static analysis of the executed logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell scripts (
scripts/gimp-send.shandscripts/gimp-start.sh) to launch GIMP binaries and manage the transmission of code to the running instance. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill translates natural language requests into executable Python scripts. This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in processed data (such as attacker-controlled filenames, image metadata, or folder paths) could be interpolated into the generated scripts.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied filenames, paths, and text content interpolated into GIMP scripts (seen in
scripts/example-poster.pyandreferences/recipes.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define strict boundary markers to distinguish between trusted code templates and untrusted user data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has full access to the GIMP API (file export, layer manipulation) and standard Python libraries (file system access via
osandglob). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of escaping or sanitization for external content before it is interpolated into the Python code delivered to GIMP.
Audit Metadata