042-planning-openspec
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from external sources such as issues and PR comments, which presents a potential injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Reads issue descriptions and paginated comments using authenticated tracker tools (SKILL.md, Workflow step 1).
- Boundary markers: Includes strong instructions to treat issue prose as untrusted requirements data that does not authorize command or code execution (references/042-planning-openspec.md, Step 1).
- Capability inventory: Restricts capabilities to the
openspecCLI and read-only tracker access. - Sanitization: Mandates the use of sanitized summaries for third-party content when used outside the specialized issue retrieval mode.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
openspeccommand-line interface for project initialization and artifact management. - Evidence: Execution of
openspec --version,openspec init,openspec new change, andopenspec validateis central to the workflow. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill emphasizes the use of official tracker tooling for data retrieval.
- Evidence: The instructions explicitly call for "authenticated, read-only tracker tooling" to establish context, minimizing the risk of credential misuse or unauthorized access.
Audit Metadata