jackin-goal-prompt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (roadmap and plan files) to generate a self-contained
/goalprompt. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in these files could be propagated to and executed by the downstream 'executor' agent. - Ingestion points: The skill reads roadmap
.mdxfiles and additional markdown plan files provided via the--planargument inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on a structured skeleton (Objective, Scope, Verify gates, etc.) to organize the output, but it does not include explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings to protect the downstream agent from malicious content in the source files.
- Capability inventory: The skill instructions involve reading local filesystem content and executing shell commands (
wc -c). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation of the input content is performed before it is distilled into the final prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The process instructions in
SKILL.mdrequire the agent to write the generated prompt to a temporary file and execute thewc -cshell command to enforce a hard 4000-character limit. While this is a standard utility used for a benign purpose, it involves direct interaction with the system shell.
Audit Metadata