higgsfield-marketplace-cards
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions to install a CLI tool by piping a remote shell script directly to an interpreter:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh. This pattern is highly dangerous as it allows for arbitrary code execution from an external source without user review or script validation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
Bashtool to run thehiggsfieldCLI. It dynamically constructs commands such ashiggsfield marketplace-cards createby interpolating user-provided text from the--promptargument and file paths from the--imageargument. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers an external network request via
curlto fetch a script from a remote repository (raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: User-provided strings for the
--promptflag and file paths for the--imageflag (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None. The input is interpolated directly into shell command arguments.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via the
Bashtool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input escaping, validation, or sanitization before the data is passed to the CLI command.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata